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EUROCAE ED 181
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EUROCAE ED 181 2010 Edition, September 2010 GUIDANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS
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Description / Abstract:
The first collision avoidance system, TCAS II (simply referred
to as TCAS here) has been in service for nearly 20 years in the USA
and Europe, and has been mandated globally for certain categories
of aircraft since 2003. There have been technological advances in
that time, providing the potential opportunity to improve TCAS or
develop new systems. Reasons to consider future airborne collision
avoidance systems 1 include:
• the changes in ATM outlined by SESAR, which include some changes that are already in hand;
• the possibility of the collision avoidance function using ADS-B in some way;
• pressures to provide collision avoidance functions for unmanned aircraft; and
• the need for improvements in the present system, viz. TCAS.
The SESAR ATM Master Plan envisages several changes in airborne collision avoidance systems. TCAS needs to be evaluated to ensure that it still performs the required collision avoidance function with new separation modes. Improved compatibility between ground-based and airborne safety nets is foreseen. New semiautomated methods of displaying and following TCAS advisories (AP/FD TCAS) have already been developed. Several ANSPs are using the TCAS RA downlink to provide information about TCAS alerts at controller work-stations. Finally, collision avoidance has to be adapted to the constraints imposed by the new separation modes.
These objectives could be met in either of two radically different ways: the incremental improvement of TCAS; or the development of new airborne collision avoidance systems (one or many). It is not obvious which of these two options would be superior, nor which might be chosen following SESAR work. This document is intended to provide a framework for either approach.
Although ADS-B is not the only new opportunity for obtaining data relevant to collision avoidance, the possibility of using ADS-B data to improve the collision avoidance logic has been recognised since almost before the acronym ADS-B was coined. RTCA has described the use of ADS-B in airborne conflict management and their concept includes a collision avoidance mode, based on ADS-B. This paper starts to outline the issues that need to be brought to these discussions.
Unmanned aircraft are expected to demand access to managed (or controlled) airspace in increasing numbers. They will need to cooperate in separation provision and they will need a collision avoidance function. TCAS was designed as an aid to a pilot on board the aircraft and care and extensive studies will be required when considering its use for unmanned aircraft. There is also discussion of a "sense-andavoid" function, but there is lack of clarity concerning whether sense-and-avoid is part of separation provision or collision avoidance. In a world where separation will be provided through trajectory management, it would seem natural to require unmanned aircraft to support trajectory management for separation provision, and to use senseand- avoid for collision avoidance. This means sense-and-avoid must be able to coordinate with TCAS, but not that it must be TCAS.
Although this document is dealing with the future of collision avoidance systems, it provides extensive discussion of TCAS, its use and the current environment. Notwithstanding technological advance, the operational role of collision avoidance and the human factors surrounding it are likely to remain largely unchanged. Future collision avoidance systems are likely to be affected by the same dilemmas as TCAS.
PURPOSE
This document discusses the role of airborne collision avoidance from other traffic. The purpose is to provide guidance on the design of airborne collision avoidance systems. While the paper contains many statements that probably imply the need for requirements, it is not a requirements document, and the words "shall" and "should" have been avoided where possible.
1 The acronym ACAS could be understood by some to be synonymous with TCAS, and by others to refer to the general function of airborne collision avoidance. Because of this ambiguity, this paper avoids using the acronym except when quoting. The phrase "airborne collision avoidance systems" refers to the general function and does not imply particular systems. The term TCAS refers to existing systems.
• the changes in ATM outlined by SESAR, which include some changes that are already in hand;
• the possibility of the collision avoidance function using ADS-B in some way;
• pressures to provide collision avoidance functions for unmanned aircraft; and
• the need for improvements in the present system, viz. TCAS.
The SESAR ATM Master Plan envisages several changes in airborne collision avoidance systems. TCAS needs to be evaluated to ensure that it still performs the required collision avoidance function with new separation modes. Improved compatibility between ground-based and airborne safety nets is foreseen. New semiautomated methods of displaying and following TCAS advisories (AP/FD TCAS) have already been developed. Several ANSPs are using the TCAS RA downlink to provide information about TCAS alerts at controller work-stations. Finally, collision avoidance has to be adapted to the constraints imposed by the new separation modes.
These objectives could be met in either of two radically different ways: the incremental improvement of TCAS; or the development of new airborne collision avoidance systems (one or many). It is not obvious which of these two options would be superior, nor which might be chosen following SESAR work. This document is intended to provide a framework for either approach.
Although ADS-B is not the only new opportunity for obtaining data relevant to collision avoidance, the possibility of using ADS-B data to improve the collision avoidance logic has been recognised since almost before the acronym ADS-B was coined. RTCA has described the use of ADS-B in airborne conflict management and their concept includes a collision avoidance mode, based on ADS-B. This paper starts to outline the issues that need to be brought to these discussions.
Unmanned aircraft are expected to demand access to managed (or controlled) airspace in increasing numbers. They will need to cooperate in separation provision and they will need a collision avoidance function. TCAS was designed as an aid to a pilot on board the aircraft and care and extensive studies will be required when considering its use for unmanned aircraft. There is also discussion of a "sense-andavoid" function, but there is lack of clarity concerning whether sense-and-avoid is part of separation provision or collision avoidance. In a world where separation will be provided through trajectory management, it would seem natural to require unmanned aircraft to support trajectory management for separation provision, and to use senseand- avoid for collision avoidance. This means sense-and-avoid must be able to coordinate with TCAS, but not that it must be TCAS.
Although this document is dealing with the future of collision avoidance systems, it provides extensive discussion of TCAS, its use and the current environment. Notwithstanding technological advance, the operational role of collision avoidance and the human factors surrounding it are likely to remain largely unchanged. Future collision avoidance systems are likely to be affected by the same dilemmas as TCAS.
PURPOSE
This document discusses the role of airborne collision avoidance from other traffic. The purpose is to provide guidance on the design of airborne collision avoidance systems. While the paper contains many statements that probably imply the need for requirements, it is not a requirements document, and the words "shall" and "should" have been avoided where possible.
1 The acronym ACAS could be understood by some to be synonymous with TCAS, and by others to refer to the general function of airborne collision avoidance. Because of this ambiguity, this paper avoids using the acronym except when quoting. The phrase "airborne collision avoidance systems" refers to the general function and does not imply particular systems. The term TCAS refers to existing systems.